This is an astonishingly good Iran deal
Updated by Max Fisher
on April 2, 2015, 8:48 p.m. ET
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EU foreign policy chief Federica
Mogherini and Iranian Foreign Minister Mohammad Javad Zarif on the
announcement of a framework deal
EU Council/Pool/Anadolu Agency/Getty Images
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When Aaron Stein was studying nuclear non-proliferation at
Middlebury College's Monterey graduate program, the students would
sometimes construct what they thought would be the best possible nuclear
inspection and monitoring regimes.
Years later, Stein is now a Middle East and nuclear proliferation expert with the Royal United Services Institute. And he says the announced on Thursday, look an awful lot like those ideal hypotheticals he'd put together in grad school.
"When I was doing my non-proliferation training at Monterey, this is
the type of inspection regime that we would dream up in our heads," he
said. "We would hope that this would be the way to actually verify all
enrichment programs, but thought that would never be feasible.
"If these are the parameters by which the [final agreement] will be signed, then this is an excellent deal," Stein concluded.
The framework nuclear deal establishes only the very basics; negotiators will continue to meet to try to turn them into a complete,
detailed agreement by the end of June. Still, the terms in the
framework, unveiled to the world after a series of late- and all-night
sessions, are remarkably detailed and almost astoundingly favorable to
the United States.
Like many observers, I doubted in recent months that Iran and
world powers would ever reach this stage; the setbacks and delays had
simply been too many. Now, here we are, and the terms are far better
than expected. There are a number of details still to be worked out,
including one very big unresolved issue that could potentially sink
everything. This is not over. But if this framework does indeed become a
full nuclear deal in July, it would be a huge success and a great deal.
Iran gives up the bulk of its nuclear program in these terms
Iran's then-President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad looks over
centrifuges at the nuclear facility at Natanz. (The Office of the
Presidency of the Islamic Republic of Iran via Getty)
The framework deal requires Iran to surrender some crucial components
of its nuclear program, in part or even in whole. Here are the
highlights:
Iran will give up about 14,000 of its 20,000 centrifuges.Iran will give up all but its most rudimentary, outdated
centrifuges: its first-generation IR-1s, knockoffs of 1970s European
models, are all it gets to keep. It will not be allowed to build or
develop newer models.Iran will give up 97 percent of its enriched uranium; it will
hold on to only 300 kilograms of its 10,000-kilogram stockpile in its
current form.Iran will destroy or export the core of its plutonium plant at
Arak, and replace it with a new core that cannot produce weapons-grade
plutonium. It will ship out all spent nuclear fuel.
Iran would simply not have much of its nuclear program left after all this.
A shorthand people sometimes use to evaluate the size of Iran's
nuclear program is its "breakout time." If Supreme Leader Ayatollah Ali
Khamenei woke up tomorrow morning and decided to kick out all of the
inspectors and set his entire nuclear program toward building a nuclear
warhead - to "break out" to a bomb - right now it would take him two or
three months. Under the terms of the framework, his program would be so
much smaller that it would take him an entire year to build a single
nuclear warhead.
These terms are not abject surrender. Iran is allowed to keep a
small nuclear program, and it won some concessions of its own. For
example, what little uranium enrichment is allowed will be done at
Iran's facility at Natanz - a hardened, reinforced-concrete structure
that was once used for covert enrichment and that the US had hoped to
close.
Iran will also be allowed to do some research at Fordow, another
hardened facility the US had wanted to close, though the research is
restricted and will be barred from using fissile material. These are not
big concessions, and they matter mostly for their symbolic value, but
it's something.
Still, when you look at many of the specifics laid out in the
framework, the hard numbers and timetables and the detailed
proscriptions, those all tend to be quite favorable to the United
States.
The core issue that the framework really nails
IAEA nuclear inspectors at Iran's nuclear facility at Natanz in 2014. (KAZEM GHANE/AFP/Getty)
Even though the agreement is only a framework, the summary released on Thursday goes into striking detail on an issue that was always going to be among the most crucial: inspections.
Whatever number of centrifuges Iran has or doesn't have, whatever
amount of uranium it's allowed to keep or forced to give up, none of it
matters unless inspectors have enough authority to hold Tehran to
its end of the deal - and to convince the Iranians that they could never
get away with cheating. To say the US got favorable terms here would be
quite an understatement; the Iranians, when it comes to inspections,
practically gave away the farm.
"I would give it an A," Stein said of the framework. When I asked why: "Because of the inspections and transparency."
There are two reasons inspections are so important. The first is that
super-stringent inspections are a deterrent: if the Iranians know that
any deviation is going to be quickly caught, they have much less
incentive to try to cheat, and much more incentive to uphold their side
of the deal.
The second is that if Iran were to try a build a nuclear weapon now,
it likely wouldn't use the material that's already known to the world
and being monitored. Rather, the Iranians would secretly manufacture
some off-the-books centrifuges, secretly mine some off-the-books
uranium, and squirrel it all away to a new, secret underground facility
somewhere. That would be the only way for Iran to build up enough of an
arsenal such that by the time the world found out, it would be too late
to do anything about it.
Really robust inspections would be the best way stop that from
happening. They would prevent Iran from sneaking off centrifuges or
siphoning away uranium that could be used to build an off-the-grid
nuclear weapons program, without the world finding out.
The inspections issue has not gotten much political attention. When I spoke to Jeffrey Lewis,
the director of the East Asia Nonproliferation Program at Middlebury's
Monterey Institute of International Studies, on Tuesday before the
framework was announced, he seemed worried that negotiators would not
focus on it much. Rather, overwhelming political focus in Washington and
Tehran on issues like Iran's number of allowed centrifuges seemed
likely to push inspections from the top priorities.
Lewis suggested that a top item on his wish list would be inspections
so robust that inspectors don't just get to visit enrichment sites like
Natanz and Fordow, but also centrifuge factories. That, he said, "would
be a big achievement."
Sure enough, come Thursday, Lewis got his wish and then some: centrifuge factory inspections is one of the terms in the framework, and it's pretty robust. For the next 20 years, inspectors would have "continuous surveillance at Iran's centrifuge rotors and bellows production and storage facilities."
"I was shocked to read that they got them to agree to let us
walk around their centrifuge production facilities. That's amazing,"
Stein said.
It's not just centrifuge factories. Inspectors will have access to
all parts of Iran's nuclear supply chain, including its uranium mines
and the mills where it processes uranium ore. Inspectors will also not
just monitor but be required to pre-approve all sales to Iran of
nuclear-related equipment. This provision also applies to something
called "dual-use" materials, which means any equipment that could be used toward a nuclear program.
"The inspections and transparency on the rotors,
and the bellows, and the uranium mines is more than I ever thought would
be in this agreement," Stein added.
Other favorable items buried in the terms

Iranian Supreme Leader Ayatollah Ali Khamenei speaks in Tehran in 2004. (BEHROUZ MEHRI/AFP/Getty)
Stein pointed out two details in the framework that I'd missed,
both of which appeared to be pretty significant concessions by the
Iranians.
First, Iran has finally agreed to comply by a rule known as Modified
Code 3.1 of the Subsidiary Arrangements General Part to Iran's
Safeguards Agreement, shorthanded as Modified Code 3.1. It says that
Iran has to notify inspectors immediately on its decision to build any
new facility where it plans to do nuclear work - long before
construction starts.
Iran in the past has either rejected this rule
or stated that it would only notify inspectors a few months before
introducing nuclear material at a facility - a "cover your ass" move in
case the world caught them building a new nuclear site. Tehran's promise
to comply may signal that it intends to stop building such covert
facilities.
Second, Stein reads the framework as including Iran's ballistic
missile program - something that critics of the deal warned would be
left out. Indeed, even many supporters of the negotiations have said
that it would be unlikely that American negotiators could get the deal
to cover ballistic missiles or other conventional weapons programs; it
would simply be asking for too much in one agreement.
"It looks like they were able to expand the scope beyond just nuclear issues," Stein said. He pointed to a line in the section that
explains the UN Security Council would replace its old resolutions
imposing sanctions on the nuclear program with a new resolution that
incorporated the finalized deal.
The line reads, "Important restrictions on conventional arms and
ballistic missiles, as well as provisions that allow for related cargo
inspections and asset freezes, will also be incorporated by this new
resolution."
"The way I read that is that they address the ballistic missile
issue, that that will remain in the new UN Security Council
resolution," Stein said. "So you're going to keep the restrictions on
ballistic missiles that are already present."
The giant gaping hole in the framework terms

Secretary of State John Kerry and Iranian Foreign Minister Javad Zarif at nuclear negotiations. (RONALD ZAK/AFP/Getty)
Still, this is just a framework deal on the basic terms; it covers a
lot, but not everything. And there is one really important topic that is
referenced only vaguely: how and when the world will lift its economic
sanctions on Iran.
This has been a major sticking point throughout negotiations. The
Iranians demand that all sanctions be lifted right away; their country
needs a functioning economy, they say, and if they're complying with all
of the restrictions as of day one then they shouldn't have to endure
crippling sanctions on day two. But the US and others worry, with good
reason, that if they lift all sanctions immediately then Iran will have
far less incentive to follow through on its commitments, as it would be
very difficult to re-impose those sanctions. And Iran has cheated on
such agreements before.
This is a really difficult issue; each side has to trust, to some
degree, that the other side will uphold its end of the deal. And someone
has to go first. After decades of enmity, that's hard.
The terms in the framework do not come near solving this issue. Iran
and the world powers, apparently failing to find a solution, have
largely punted.
"I read the fact sheet as confirming that they are still far apart on scheduling sanctions relief," Lewis said in an email. "Still a very large devil - a Great Satan if you will - in the details."
What the terms do say is that the US, Europe, and UN Security Council
will remove their sanctions after Iran fulfills its end of the deal.
But it is still very unclear how exactly that gets determined, when that
happens, or whether it means the sanctions are lifted all at once or
over time.
The terms do suggest that the IAEA will have "teeth," as Stein put
it, in punishing Iran if it concludes that the Iranians are not
upholding their commitments. And if Iran breaks its end of the bargain,
the sanctions will in theory "snap back."
Russia, though, opposes putting any sort of automatic enforcement
mechanism into UN Security Council sanctions. So it's not clear if "snap
back" means that sanctions will automatically trigger back into place
(unlikely) or if the US would have to try to corral the necessary votes
to bring them back manually (very difficult).
This was always perhaps the hardest issue. It remains the hardest
issue. That the negotiators could not find anything more detailed to say
is concerning.
This, so far, is about the best we could ask for
Kerry and Zarif shake hands in 2014 as Omani Foreign
Minister Yussef bin Alawi and former EU top diplomat Catherine Ashton
watch. (Nicholas Kamm/AFP/Getty Images)
"Really, it's a very strong framework," Jeffrey Lewis said when I asked him what he thought.
"As a framework it's very good," tweeted added,
"A sharp critic of Iran and skeptic of the talks told me after the
announcement that it seemed to be heavily tilted in favour of the West."
The Arms Control Association issued a statement saying that the
"historic" agreement "promises to lead to one of the most consequential
and far-reaching nuclear nonproliferation achievements in recent
decades."
Everyone is very careful to note that this is a provisional
framework. It could fall apart before it becomes a full, final deal. The
negotiators, between now and the end-of-June deadline, could get bogged
down in details like sanctions relief. It will be hard, and it could
fail.
But we do have something substantial and important in this framework. The terms in the agreement are
just about the best that we could hope for - even better, in some ways,
than many had thought possible. The concessions from Iran are painful
and many; the concessions by the US minor and few; the details
surprisingly robust.
President Obama is framing the deal, somewhat defensively, as the
best alternative to war. Indeed it is that. But it is also the start of
what could become a substantial and long-term curb to Iran's nuclear
program, a major step toward reducing the hostility between Iran and the
West, and thus a potentially transformative change for the region.
WATCH: President Obama's remarks on nuclear deal with Iran
Filed under:Energy
In this StoryStream
The Iran nuclear deal: everything you need to know
3:00p
How to survive your family's arguments about the Middle East
Apr 2
This is an astonishingly good Iran deal
Apr 2
The most important quote from Obama's Iran deal speech
9 updates
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Updated by Max Fisher
on April 2, 2015, 8:48 p.m. ET
@Max_Fisher
max@vox.com
Tweet
(1,489)
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(7,592)
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EU foreign policy chief Federica
Mogherini and Iranian Foreign Minister Mohammad Javad Zarif on the
announcement of a framework deal
EU Council/Pool/Anadolu Agency/Getty Images
Don't miss stories.
Follow Vox!
When Aaron Stein was studying nuclear non-proliferation at
Middlebury College's Monterey graduate program, the students would
sometimes construct what they thought would be the best possible nuclear
inspection and monitoring regimes.
Years later, Stein is now a Middle East and nuclear proliferation expert with the Royal United Services Institute. And he says the announced on Thursday, look an awful lot like those ideal hypotheticals he'd put together in grad school.
"When I was doing my non-proliferation training at Monterey, this is
the type of inspection regime that we would dream up in our heads," he
said. "We would hope that this would be the way to actually verify all
enrichment programs, but thought that would never be feasible.
"If these are the parameters by which the [final agreement] will be signed, then this is an excellent deal," Stein concluded.
The framework nuclear deal establishes only the very basics; negotiators will continue to meet to try to turn them into a complete,
detailed agreement by the end of June. Still, the terms in the
framework, unveiled to the world after a series of late- and all-night
sessions, are remarkably detailed and almost astoundingly favorable to
the United States.
Like many observers, I doubted in recent months that Iran and
world powers would ever reach this stage; the setbacks and delays had
simply been too many. Now, here we are, and the terms are far better
than expected. There are a number of details still to be worked out,
including one very big unresolved issue that could potentially sink
everything. This is not over. But if this framework does indeed become a
full nuclear deal in July, it would be a huge success and a great deal.
Iran gives up the bulk of its nuclear program in these terms
Iran's then-President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad looks over
centrifuges at the nuclear facility at Natanz. (The Office of the
Presidency of the Islamic Republic of Iran via Getty)
The framework deal requires Iran to surrender some crucial components
of its nuclear program, in part or even in whole. Here are the
highlights:
Iran will give up about 14,000 of its 20,000 centrifuges.Iran will give up all but its most rudimentary, outdated
centrifuges: its first-generation IR-1s, knockoffs of 1970s European
models, are all it gets to keep. It will not be allowed to build or
develop newer models.Iran will give up 97 percent of its enriched uranium; it will
hold on to only 300 kilograms of its 10,000-kilogram stockpile in its
current form.Iran will destroy or export the core of its plutonium plant at
Arak, and replace it with a new core that cannot produce weapons-grade
plutonium. It will ship out all spent nuclear fuel.
Iran would simply not have much of its nuclear program left after all this.
A shorthand people sometimes use to evaluate the size of Iran's
nuclear program is its "breakout time." If Supreme Leader Ayatollah Ali
Khamenei woke up tomorrow morning and decided to kick out all of the
inspectors and set his entire nuclear program toward building a nuclear
warhead - to "break out" to a bomb - right now it would take him two or
three months. Under the terms of the framework, his program would be so
much smaller that it would take him an entire year to build a single
nuclear warhead.
These terms are not abject surrender. Iran is allowed to keep a
small nuclear program, and it won some concessions of its own. For
example, what little uranium enrichment is allowed will be done at
Iran's facility at Natanz - a hardened, reinforced-concrete structure
that was once used for covert enrichment and that the US had hoped to
close.
Iran will also be allowed to do some research at Fordow, another
hardened facility the US had wanted to close, though the research is
restricted and will be barred from using fissile material. These are not
big concessions, and they matter mostly for their symbolic value, but
it's something.
Still, when you look at many of the specifics laid out in the
framework, the hard numbers and timetables and the detailed
proscriptions, those all tend to be quite favorable to the United
States.
The core issue that the framework really nails
IAEA nuclear inspectors at Iran's nuclear facility at Natanz in 2014. (KAZEM GHANE/AFP/Getty)
Even though the agreement is only a framework, the summary released on Thursday goes into striking detail on an issue that was always going to be among the most crucial: inspections.
Whatever number of centrifuges Iran has or doesn't have, whatever
amount of uranium it's allowed to keep or forced to give up, none of it
matters unless inspectors have enough authority to hold Tehran to
its end of the deal - and to convince the Iranians that they could never
get away with cheating. To say the US got favorable terms here would be
quite an understatement; the Iranians, when it comes to inspections,
practically gave away the farm.
"I would give it an A," Stein said of the framework. When I asked why: "Because of the inspections and transparency."
There are two reasons inspections are so important. The first is that
super-stringent inspections are a deterrent: if the Iranians know that
any deviation is going to be quickly caught, they have much less
incentive to try to cheat, and much more incentive to uphold their side
of the deal.
The second is that if Iran were to try a build a nuclear weapon now,
it likely wouldn't use the material that's already known to the world
and being monitored. Rather, the Iranians would secretly manufacture
some off-the-books centrifuges, secretly mine some off-the-books
uranium, and squirrel it all away to a new, secret underground facility
somewhere. That would be the only way for Iran to build up enough of an
arsenal such that by the time the world found out, it would be too late
to do anything about it.
Really robust inspections would be the best way stop that from
happening. They would prevent Iran from sneaking off centrifuges or
siphoning away uranium that could be used to build an off-the-grid
nuclear weapons program, without the world finding out.
The inspections issue has not gotten much political attention. When I spoke to Jeffrey Lewis,
the director of the East Asia Nonproliferation Program at Middlebury's
Monterey Institute of International Studies, on Tuesday before the
framework was announced, he seemed worried that negotiators would not
focus on it much. Rather, overwhelming political focus in Washington and
Tehran on issues like Iran's number of allowed centrifuges seemed
likely to push inspections from the top priorities.
Lewis suggested that a top item on his wish list would be inspections
so robust that inspectors don't just get to visit enrichment sites like
Natanz and Fordow, but also centrifuge factories. That, he said, "would
be a big achievement."
Sure enough, come Thursday, Lewis got his wish and then some: centrifuge factory inspections is one of the terms in the framework, and it's pretty robust. For the next 20 years, inspectors would have "continuous surveillance at Iran's centrifuge rotors and bellows production and storage facilities."
"I was shocked to read that they got them to agree to let us
walk around their centrifuge production facilities. That's amazing,"
Stein said.
It's not just centrifuge factories. Inspectors will have access to
all parts of Iran's nuclear supply chain, including its uranium mines
and the mills where it processes uranium ore. Inspectors will also not
just monitor but be required to pre-approve all sales to Iran of
nuclear-related equipment. This provision also applies to something
called "dual-use" materials, which means any equipment that could be used toward a nuclear program.
"The inspections and transparency on the rotors,
and the bellows, and the uranium mines is more than I ever thought would
be in this agreement," Stein added.
Other favorable items buried in the terms

Iranian Supreme Leader Ayatollah Ali Khamenei speaks in Tehran in 2004. (BEHROUZ MEHRI/AFP/Getty)
Stein pointed out two details in the framework that I'd missed,
both of which appeared to be pretty significant concessions by the
Iranians.
First, Iran has finally agreed to comply by a rule known as Modified
Code 3.1 of the Subsidiary Arrangements General Part to Iran's
Safeguards Agreement, shorthanded as Modified Code 3.1. It says that
Iran has to notify inspectors immediately on its decision to build any
new facility where it plans to do nuclear work - long before
construction starts.
Iran in the past has either rejected this rule
or stated that it would only notify inspectors a few months before
introducing nuclear material at a facility - a "cover your ass" move in
case the world caught them building a new nuclear site. Tehran's promise
to comply may signal that it intends to stop building such covert
facilities.
Second, Stein reads the framework as including Iran's ballistic
missile program - something that critics of the deal warned would be
left out. Indeed, even many supporters of the negotiations have said
that it would be unlikely that American negotiators could get the deal
to cover ballistic missiles or other conventional weapons programs; it
would simply be asking for too much in one agreement.
"It looks like they were able to expand the scope beyond just nuclear issues," Stein said. He pointed to a line in the section that
explains the UN Security Council would replace its old resolutions
imposing sanctions on the nuclear program with a new resolution that
incorporated the finalized deal.
The line reads, "Important restrictions on conventional arms and
ballistic missiles, as well as provisions that allow for related cargo
inspections and asset freezes, will also be incorporated by this new
resolution."
"The way I read that is that they address the ballistic missile
issue, that that will remain in the new UN Security Council
resolution," Stein said. "So you're going to keep the restrictions on
ballistic missiles that are already present."
The giant gaping hole in the framework terms

Secretary of State John Kerry and Iranian Foreign Minister Javad Zarif at nuclear negotiations. (RONALD ZAK/AFP/Getty)
Still, this is just a framework deal on the basic terms; it covers a
lot, but not everything. And there is one really important topic that is
referenced only vaguely: how and when the world will lift its economic
sanctions on Iran.
This has been a major sticking point throughout negotiations. The
Iranians demand that all sanctions be lifted right away; their country
needs a functioning economy, they say, and if they're complying with all
of the restrictions as of day one then they shouldn't have to endure
crippling sanctions on day two. But the US and others worry, with good
reason, that if they lift all sanctions immediately then Iran will have
far less incentive to follow through on its commitments, as it would be
very difficult to re-impose those sanctions. And Iran has cheated on
such agreements before.
This is a really difficult issue; each side has to trust, to some
degree, that the other side will uphold its end of the deal. And someone
has to go first. After decades of enmity, that's hard.
The terms in the framework do not come near solving this issue. Iran
and the world powers, apparently failing to find a solution, have
largely punted.
"I read the fact sheet as confirming that they are still far apart on scheduling sanctions relief," Lewis said in an email. "Still a very large devil - a Great Satan if you will - in the details."
What the terms do say is that the US, Europe, and UN Security Council
will remove their sanctions after Iran fulfills its end of the deal.
But it is still very unclear how exactly that gets determined, when that
happens, or whether it means the sanctions are lifted all at once or
over time.
The terms do suggest that the IAEA will have "teeth," as Stein put
it, in punishing Iran if it concludes that the Iranians are not
upholding their commitments. And if Iran breaks its end of the bargain,
the sanctions will in theory "snap back."
Russia, though, opposes putting any sort of automatic enforcement
mechanism into UN Security Council sanctions. So it's not clear if "snap
back" means that sanctions will automatically trigger back into place
(unlikely) or if the US would have to try to corral the necessary votes
to bring them back manually (very difficult).
This was always perhaps the hardest issue. It remains the hardest
issue. That the negotiators could not find anything more detailed to say
is concerning.
This, so far, is about the best we could ask for
Kerry and Zarif shake hands in 2014 as Omani Foreign
Minister Yussef bin Alawi and former EU top diplomat Catherine Ashton
watch. (Nicholas Kamm/AFP/Getty Images)
"Really, it's a very strong framework," Jeffrey Lewis said when I asked him what he thought.
"As a framework it's very good," tweeted added,
"A sharp critic of Iran and skeptic of the talks told me after the
announcement that it seemed to be heavily tilted in favour of the West."
The Arms Control Association issued a statement saying that the
"historic" agreement "promises to lead to one of the most consequential
and far-reaching nuclear nonproliferation achievements in recent
decades."
Everyone is very careful to note that this is a provisional
framework. It could fall apart before it becomes a full, final deal. The
negotiators, between now and the end-of-June deadline, could get bogged
down in details like sanctions relief. It will be hard, and it could
fail.
But we do have something substantial and important in this framework. The terms in the agreement are
just about the best that we could hope for - even better, in some ways,
than many had thought possible. The concessions from Iran are painful
and many; the concessions by the US minor and few; the details
surprisingly robust.
President Obama is framing the deal, somewhat defensively, as the
best alternative to war. Indeed it is that. But it is also the start of
what could become a substantial and long-term curb to Iran's nuclear
program, a major step toward reducing the hostility between Iran and the
West, and thus a potentially transformative change for the region.
WATCH: President Obama's remarks on nuclear deal with Iran
Filed under:Energy
In this StoryStream
The Iran nuclear deal: everything you need to know
3:00p
How to survive your family's arguments about the Middle East
Apr 2
This is an astonishingly good Iran deal
Apr 2
The most important quote from Obama's Iran deal speech
9 updates
Tweet
(1,489)
Share
(7,592)
Next Up
Employers added a dismal 126,000 jobs in March
Why you shouldn't take health advice from Mark Cuban
Welcome to the one week a year when immigrants can get H-1B visas
The Army is finally changing its ridiculous tattoo policy
The simple economic principle that can help you get a better deal at hotels
PRESENTED BY
[/URL]
Most Read
1
An Indiana woman is facing 20 years in prison for "feticide"
2
Claw machines are rigged - here's why it's so hard to grab that stuffed animal
3
Joni Mitchell suffers from a disease most doctors think isn't real
4
This is an astonishingly good Iran deal
5
Stanford just made tuition free for families earning less than $125,000 per year
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